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Liberia’s Run-up to 2017: Continuity and Change in a Long History of Electoral 
Politics 
 
If successfully orchestrated, the October 2017 elections in Liberia will mark the first time 
in recent memory when a democratically elected Liberian president - Ellen Johnson 
Sirleaf - will hand over power to a similarly elected head of state. This will most likely be 
a close election and the briefing investigates changes and continuities in the candidates, 
political parties, electoral processes and the workings of the state of Liberia at a 
watershed moment in a long and shifting democratic history.  
 
Keywords 
 
Liberia, elections, post-war development, transnationalism, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, George 
Weah 
 
Introduction 
 
In a striking paradox, dramatic changes in the character of Liberian elections have 
occurred across space and time, especially since the end of armed conflict in 2003, whilst 
many difficulties remain ahead of hotly contested forthcoming elections. Likely to be 
very close, Liberia’s third, post-war elections slated for October 2017 already indicate 
continuities and changes from the immediate electoral past, and indeed from the pre-war 
and wartime polls. These elections, if successfully orchestrated, will mark the first time in 
recent memory where a democratically elected Liberian president will hand over power 
to a similarly elected head of state.  
 
The aim of this briefing is to consider the candidates, parties, processes and the state of 
Liberia in advance of voting in October  and to map where continuities and changes may 
lie. For example, President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf is stepping down leaving a rather 
unpredictable field with some familiar names—including Sirleaf’s Vice President Joseph 
Boakaii of the ruling Unity Party (UP) and former footballer and 2005 presidential 
candidate George Weah of the Congress for Democratic Change (CDC) amongst the 
opposition—several relative newcomers and no women as viable presidential 
frontrunners. Beginning with a historical mapping of Liberia’s democratic trajectory, the 
briefing speaks to the notion of what constitutes electoral democracy, the associated 
fields of state-society relations, identity, multi-party elections and transnationalism, and 
concludes by taking stock of electoral politics at this juncture in Liberia.  
 
For over a century, from 1878 until 1980, Liberia’s democracy was so restricted that 
Africa’s first republic effectively gave birth to Africa’s first one-party state. The True 
Whig Party (TWP), dominated by black settlers, ruled through an electoral system which 
rarely saw any potential for a turnover and where the party elite monopolised the political 
and economic environment (Liebenow 1987). Liberia had just two presidents between the 
end of World War II and the start of the 1980s (Ibid). TWP hegemony, however, came to 
an abrupt end in the military coup of 1980 which brought the junior army officer, Samuel 
Kanyon Doe, to power (Ibid). In electoral terms, Doe’s tenure was accompanied by 
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greater levels of violence and rigging when he was forced to the ballot box in 1985 by 
internal pressure and external persuasion from Liberia’s main supporter, the United States 
(Sawyer 2005; Sirleaf 2010; Berkeley 1986). Most estimates put Doe’s presidential vote 
in 1985 at about half of the 51% that he claimed (Ibid). Following the election, Liberia 
slid towards greater uncertainty and finally war in December 1989. After nearly seven 
years of harrowing armed conflict, a peace deal in 1996 led to elections the following 
year. Although rebel leader Charles Taylor was always the likely winner due to the twin 
fears of his return to armed conflict if he lost and the probability that none of the other 
candidates would be able to maintain peace, the 1997 polls were mostly seen as another 
in the Liberian canon of questionable democratic elections (Sawyer 2005; Harris 1999; 
Lyons 1999). 
 
Much of this, however, changed dramatically from 2005 onwards. The second outbreak 
of Liberia’s conflict was brought to an end by the exile of Taylor in 2003 and power 
passed to the National Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL). The ensuing polls 
were extraordinary in many ways. In a complete shift from the past, 2005 was marked by 
highly competitive elections with no incumbent and the use of state resources seemingly 
spread across a number of parties with access to the coalition NTGL. Violence, overt 
rigging and indeed rebel parties were almost absent, the latter probably content with the 
victory against Taylor or the spoils of the coalition government. The results were also 
remarkable (Harris 2006; Sawyer 2008). Sirleaf came out as a clear winner against Weah 
in the presidential run-off after only coming second in the first poll. Sirleaf’s UP was not 
even the largest party in either the Senate or the House of Representatives, with Weah’s 
CDC winning almost double the number of UP seats in the House (NEC Liberia 2005). 
Candidates from a plethora of parties and independents gained unlikely victories all over 
the country (Ibid). There were no clean sweeps of presidential, Senate and House 
elections by any party in any of Liberia’s sub-political divisions—called counties—
showing that party loyalty was far from guaranteed (Ibid). There were still the problems 
of money and where it comes from and goes to, and perhaps an understandably large 
post-war presence of diaspora returnees, but the dispersal of party representation in a 
relatively clean and peaceful election was not only unusual in Liberia but equally so in 
Africa. 
 
The issue of incumbency re-emerged for the 2011 elections with Sirleaf standing for 
president once again as standard bearer of the UP (Harris and Lewis 2012). As might be 
expected after a term where peace had held and some economic progress made and with 
incumbent advantage, Sirleaf won the presidential election and the UP increased its total 
of Representatives threefold and more than doubled its number of Senators (NEC Liberia 
2011). However, Sirleaf once again only secured victory in the presidential run-off which 
was this time boycotted by CDC, and the UP’s gains still left them significantly short of a 
majority in either legislative body (Ibid). Representation from small parties and 
independents remained high (Ibid). Regional blocs became clearer in 2011, but they were 
still permeated by other parties and independents, showing again that party consolidation 
remains problematic (Ibid). However, pockets of violence returned and the run-off 
boycott was inspired by allegations of electoral fraud (Harris and Lewis 2012). As in 
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2005, diaspora returnees and transnationals played a large role, including the opposition 
ticket of Winston Tubman and Weah for president and vice-president, respectively. 
 
Continuities  
 
From a perspective of continuity, one might then record elements that have endured in 
the condition of the state and the country, the candidates and parties, and the electoral 
processes. A 2016 Afrobarometer survey noted that around half of Liberians surveyed 
said Liberia was enjoying a ‘full democracy’ or a ‘democracy with minor problems’ with 
the other half much less optimistic (Okuru and Armah-Attoh 2016). This needs some 
explanation.  
 
First, then, one might observe longstanding patterns of state activity and strained state-
society relations that are more or less maintained. Although the state and infrastructure 
function better than at any point since the 1970s, it is still operating at a low capacity, 
particularly as it relates to economic revitalisation. Sirleaf’s first term was marked by 
steady growth rates of between 5% and 8%, foreign direct investment totalling US$16 
billion, and sharp increases in export revenue, yet these macro-level advancements did 
not significantly alter the living conditions of most Liberians, 64% of whom still live 
below the poverty line (Pailey 2014). Similarly, gross economic mismanagement led to 
repeated budget shortfalls in the early part of Sirleaf’s second term followed by high 
inflation, despite her administration receiving donor largess in the millions (Ibid). The 
Ebola epidemic of 2014/2015 and recent downturn in iron ore and rubber prices have 
spiralled Liberia into a further recession, with recent protests against exchange rate 
fluctuation and the government’s decision to increase taxes on basic commodities and 
telecommunications foregrounding the economy as a hot-button topic for elections in 
2017 and beyond (AfDB 2016; Daily Observer 2017b; Front Page Africa 2017; Bush 
Chicken 2017a).  
 
Equally, the twin imperatives of diverting state resources for personal gain and political 
and social support, importantly at election times, are regularly contested as well as 
covered in media reports on, and even state narratives of, corruption. One need not look 
far to find stories of corruption involving elected and appointed officials such as the 2016 
state investigation of UK company, Sable Mining, and its alleged attempts to secure a 
major iron ore concession in northern Liberia by hiring in 2010 top Liberian lawyer 
Varney Sherman, now UP chair and Grand Cape Mount Senator, to bribe, amongst 
others, then Speaker of the House, J. Alex Tyler and Sirleaf’s son, Fumba Sirleaf (Global 
Witness 2016). The president has been criticised from many quarters for the promotion of 
her relatives to high positions of government (BBC 2012) and John Morlu’s strident 
claims as Auditor General about corruption in the Sirleaf administration, captured further 
below, are an indication that elected and appointed positions are often perceived as the 
gateway for amassing personal wealth that could be used for campaigning during 
elections. 
 
As in most elections, African and otherwise, being the incumbent party will once again 
allow the ruling UP, now fronted by vice-president Boakai, to take a considerable 
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advantage. On the one hand, for example, state funds can be diverted into infrastructure 
projects in politically sensitive areas. On the other, funds can be channelled into 
campaigning, either in the form of razzmatazz—in which major streets are blocked for 
hours with long convoys of campaign cars—the distribution of t-shirts and bags of rice or 
in terms of keeping sweet those in positions of government, state, community or 
‘traditional’ authority who can, or say they can, deliver bloc votes. Boakai is surely aware 
of democratic history in Africa, where turnovers are more common and ruling parties are 
more vulnerable when the incumbent stands down and a successor is fronted (Cheeseman 
2010), and Sirleaf’s mixed record will mean he needs to take stock accordingly. 
 
Another method of shoring up support is to lean on ethno-regional bases. This is not so 
straightforward in Liberia as in other African states such as neighbouring Sierra Leone or 
Ghana, where patterns are more, if not completely, predictable (Conteh and Harris 2014c; 
Bening and Kelly 2013). Liberia’s recent history of wide representation across many 
parties and independents and high numbers of local-level turnovers shows an electorate 
weighing up its options and parties that are not consolidated enough to forge or hold onto 
electoral bases. These patterns continued from 2005 to 2011 and into the 2014 senatorial 
elections and look likely to remain, particularly given the partial political vacuum at the 
very top.ii No doubt Boakai will do well in his home county of Lofa and probably 
Sirleaf’s stronghold in Bomi, but elsewhere is in the balance. Other political leaders have 
similar bases but uncertain prospects further afield. 
 
It is not just Boakai who shows continuity in key actors from the past, it is also 
opposition leaders. Those who have already announced they will be making a bid for the 
presidency include Weah; two-time presidential candidate Charles Brumskine of the 
Liberty Party (LP) with his base in Grand Bassa County; former rebel leader and current 
Senator Prince Johnson of the Movement for Democracy and Reconstruction (MDR) 
with considerable support in Nimba County; Morlu of the Justice and Anti-
Corruption Party (JACP); and wealthy businessman and former Taylor loyalist, Benoni 
Urey of the All Liberian Party (ALP), although the latter two have not run electorally for 
office before and will also appear later in the ‘Facets of Change’ section. Sherman would 
no doubt also have returned in some form if the Sable Mining affair had not emerged, and 
of course may still do. Although one opposition coalition appears to be sealed involving 
Weah, Tyler and Jewel Howard Taylor, Bong County Senator, former wife of Charles 
Taylor and leader of his old party, the National Patriotic Party (NPP), it is likely that most 
opposition political parties will return amongst numerous newer and smaller outfits. 
Indeed, the transnational nature of the candidates also continues, with many spending 
considerable time outside Liberia.  
 
A notable omission so far has been discussion of party platforms, campaign promises and 
messaging, which will undoubtedly have a bearing on official campaigning from August 
8 to October 8 (The New Republic 2016). As in 2005 and 2011, party policy 
pronouncements tend to be broad and promise the dividends of economic development 
such as employment and financing for agriculture; the provision of infrastructure and 
basic social services such as roads, electricity, education and health; the elimination of 
corruption; and the unity and security of the nation. Nevertheless, platforms tend not to 
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differ to any great extent and actual divergences in policy are not prominent (Front Page 
Africa 2016k). Effectively, parties lean more on considerations of personalities, 
patronage, regional bases and claims to performance at national and local levels. For 
instance, Sirleaf made much of her international finance experience in 2005, just as some 
of the newer candidates profess business or banking acumen in 2017; similarly, Weah 
makes appeals to youth while deriving much of his support from Monrovia and the 
Southeast of the country.  
 
Finally, the structures in place for the 2017 elections need some consideration. Insecurity 
is an ever-present, if sometimes latent, problem. The Liberian police and military have 
been criticised as not ready—the police struggling in particular to handle violence in 
Monrovia on the eve of the run-off in 2011 (Carter Center 2011)—and may face a stern 
test with the dwindling United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) (see ‘Facets of 
Change’ section). The latest chair of the National Elections Commission (NEC), Jerome 
G. Korkoya, inherits an institution which made a number of mistakes in 2011, was seen 
as biased by the opposition, and lost its chair before the elections took place. In 2017, the 
NEC continues to struggle for legitimacy with a voter registration exercise that has been 
mired by technical and logistical glitches from its very inception on February 1 (Daily 
Observer 2017a; Bush Chicken 2017b; Bush Chicken 2017c; Bush Chicken 2017d). 
Similar to challenges facing the NEC, constitutional and electoral laws may be brought to 
bear once again if events do not proceed smoothly. Previous elections have been litigious. 
In 2011, the Supreme Court was required to rule on the politically problematic results of 
the pre-election referendum, in particular deciding that the 10-year residency clause for 
presidential and vice-presidential candidates would only apply after 2011, and on post-
election claims of electoral fraud, finding that there was insufficient evidence for the 
fraud alleged by the CDC (Sendolo 2011; Harris and Lewis 2012). As outlined above, 
2017 promises to be a closely-fought election and hence all structures will most likely be 
tested. 
 
Facets of Change 
 
Recent changes in Liberia’s political milieu will most likely have a significant bearing on 
election results, including the introduction of new candidates and political alliances, legal 
provisions and the likely consequences of the Ebola outbreak on voting patterns.  
 
New Presidential Aspirants Enter the Fray  
 
Previously an employee of the World Bank in Washington, DC, J. Mills Jones of the 
Movement for Economic Empowerment (MOVEE) party represents a prototypical 
returnee technocrat catapulted into Liberia’s higher echelons of power with an 
appointment by Sirleaf as Central Bank Governor (CBL) for two consecutive terms in 
2006 and 2011 (Bush Chicken 2016; Front Page Africa 2016a). Although he is largely 
known by Monrovia’s political elite and has virtually no ethno-regional base, Jones is 
rumoured to have posed a threat to the House and Senate establishment because of his 
control over fiscal/monetary policies and financial disbursements (Front Page Africa 
2015a). It is speculated that Jones’ introduction of a loan programme targeting the rural 
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poor was a clever guise to secure political endorsements, which prompted his resignation 
after the Legislature in 2014 amended sections of the Central Bank of Liberia Act 
prohibiting appointed officials of the Bank—including the Governor—from contesting 
political office ‘within three years consecutively after the expiration of their tenure and in 
his/her resignation from the Central Bank of Liberia’ (The News 2014; Government of 
Liberia 2014a).  
 
Morlu, the previously mentioned firebrand anti-corruption campaigner, is widely popular 
for his unsubstantiated claim in 2009 that Sirleaf’s government was ‘three times more 
corrupt’ than the erstwhile NTGL (VoA 2007). Employing his strong contacts in the 
media to publish audit reports in local dailies, Morlu earned the ire of Sirleaf for naming 
and shaming her loyalists for alleged financial impropriety. Needless to say, Morlu was 
not reappointed by Sirleaf in her second term, thus returning to the United States where 
he currently serves as managing partner of a Washington, DC based certified public 
accounting firm (Executive Mansion 2011). Although Morlu has resided consecutively in 
the United States since 2011 and is rumoured to hold American citizenship, he continues 
to elicit support from domestic citizens though his chances of winning the presidential 
election are slim. Like Jones, Morlu claims to represent the poor and disaffected yet his 
European Union-funded six-figure salary as Auditor General amidst crippling poverty in 
Liberia cast him primarily as an urban elite technocrat who benefitted generously from 
the very system he critiqued (The Perspective 2009).  
 
Urey, the previously mentioned former head of the lucrative Bureau of Maritime Affairs 
(now the Liberia Maritime Authority), has never held a major elected office although he 
was appointed acting mayor of the city of Careysburg by Sirleaf in 2009 and 
subsequently elected mayor by the City Council (Executive Mansion 2009; All Liberian 
Party n.d.). A serial entrepreneur who reportedly amassed wealth from his dealings with 
Taylor, including their monopoly over the telecommunications sector via Lonestar Cell, 
Urey was in 2013 de-listed from a UN travel and assets freeze ban (UNSC 2013). 
Although the billionaire-turned-politician has the financial clout to pull off an election 
upset as a possible spoiler, his largely urban and peri-urban based enterprises and lack of 
party recognition mean he may not pose a major threat to more established figures like 
Boakai, Weah, Brumskine, or Johnson.  
 
A former Executive Vice President and Chief Administrative Officer of Coca-Cola, 
Alexander Cummings is perhaps the greenest presidential aspirant, having held neither an 
elected nor an appointed position in government (Global Atlanta 2016). As a testament to 
his political astuteness, however, Cummings managed in April 2016 to clinch the 
nomination of the opposition Alternative National Congress (ANC), a splinter faction of 
Weah’s CDC (Front Page Africa 2016c; Front Page Africa 2013). Although he has been 
heralded as a results-driven corporate manager, Cummings’ relative inexperience in 
Liberia’s political milieu is likely to only garner sufficient name recognition for 
subsequent elections should he attempt to contest in future races (Front Page Africa 
2016f). Furthermore, questions about Cummings’ Liberian citizenship have raised 
concerns about his eligibility to run (Front Page Africa 2015b).  
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‘Pseudo-Incumbency’ and Opposition Coalitions 
 
As a standing vice-president running for Liberia’s highest office, Boakai is indicative of a 
‘pseudo-incumbency’, which stands in stark contrast to the ‘no incumbency factor’ of 
2005, where no presidential candidate had been elected previously, and the glaring 
incumbency factor of 2011, in which Sirleaf was seeking a second mandate. Boakai’s 
unflinching loyalty and unassuming role as Sirleaf’s second-in-command for 12 years 
have served him well, enabling him to secure the coveted UP nomination despite constant 
in-party bickering about succession (The News 2016). 
 
While Boakai may be the ‘pseudo-incumbent’ to beat, attempts have been made by 
opposition parties to form a coalition that could likely oust the ruling UP. Small-scale 
political coalitions featured in 2011, however what remains unprecedented is the 
September 2016 Opposition Political Parties Collaboration Summit convened in Ganta, 
Nimba County, by standard bearers representing 12 leading opposition parties—including 
Weah and CDC, Brumskine and LP, Johnson and MDR, Urey and ALP, and Cummings 
and ANC (Front Page Africa 2016g). Although a possible coalition of the willing may 
likely upset Boakai’s chances of clinching victory in a first round, it is unclear if the 
opposition can put away personal ambitions to effectively upend the UP by uniting 
behind a single candidate. As a case in point, while the Nimba meeting convened by 
Johnson climaxed in the endorsement of a ‘Ganta Declaration’, Weah subsequently 
forged the Coalition for Democratic Change in separate alliances with Howard Taylor’s 
NPP and former speaker Tyler’s Liberia People Democratic Party (LPDP), illustrating the 
potentially advantageous yet tenuous nature of opposition solidarity (Front Page Africa 
2016j; Front Page Africa 2016i). The importance of an opposition coalition is not just 
that it unites various support bases, but also that it can help fuel a sense that the 
opposition might actually win thus increasing turnout in opposition areas. 
 
Enforcement of Residency, Citizenship, Code of Conduct and Campaign Finance Laws    
 
In 2017, it is possible that a 10-year residency requirement for presidential candidates 
enshrined in the 1986 Liberian Constitution may come into effect thus barring some 
presidential hopefuls from entering the race (The Liberian Connection n.d.). Although the 
clause should have been enforced in the 2011 elections based on the outcome of a 
national referendum, for political expediency it was instead referred to the Supreme 
Court of Liberia, which maintained that it would be enforced in 2017 instead. The clause 
states explicitly that only those who reside in Liberia for 10 consecutive years are eligible 
to contest the presidency; thus, if enforced, it will likely adversely impact candidates such 
as Morlu and Cummings, who have not lived in the country consecutively for the past 
decade.  
 
In addition to contestations over eligibility linked to residency, Liberian citizenship, or 
lack thereof, features more prominently in public discourse than ever before (Pailey 
2014b; Pailey 2016). Akin to nearly two thirds of African countries, Liberia does not 
explicitly recognise dual citizenship primarily due to a contradiction between the 
country’s 1986 Constitution—which implicitly legislates dual citizenship—and the 1973 
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Aliens and Nationality Law—which explicitly renounces dual citizenship (Ibid). 
Although the presumed foreign citizenship of candidates such as Sirleaf and Weah have 
been invoked in the past two elections, current domestic and transnational debates 
abound about a contested dual citizenship bill introduced in 2008 (Pailey 2014b; Pailey 
2016; Front Page Africa 2016b). Although the bill was rejected during the April 2015 
Constitutional Review Conference held in Gbarnga, Bong County, a November 2016 
vote by Liberia’s House of Representatives placed the proposed bill on the table as a 
possible item for a forthcoming referendum (Liberia News Agency 2015; Daily Observer 
2016). Given current contestations around the political subjectivity of Liberians who may 
have naturalised elsewhere, and thus automatically revoked their Liberian citizenship, the 
candidacies of Cummings, Morlu and others will likely continue to be called into 
question (Daily Observer 2015). This is reflective of the tactics of some incumbent 
governments in Africa that have used citizenship clauses and regulations to bar certain 
candidates from running, which has been handled relatively peacefully in some cases (ie., 
Zambia) while fuelling electoral violence in others (ie, Côte d'Ivoire) (Manby 2009).  
 
As contestations over citizenship and residency continue to be more pronounced than 
ever before in Liberia, there have also been political fisticuffs concerning the 
enforceability of the 2014 Code of Conduct for civil servants, which requires presidential 
and legislative aspirants to resign from appointed office at least two years before 
elections (Front Page Africa 2016e). Although the Code of Conduct attempts to 
democratise the franchise, deterring candidates from exploiting public office and state 
funds to gain momentum, it is widely believed that it was invoked to curb the candidacies 
of popular political appointees, rather than intended to level the playing field.  
 
Perhaps the most controversial law to have a major bearing on 2017 is the highly 
contested Democracy Sustainability Act—passed by the House and Senate in 2012 
despite receiving public censure for being unwarranted in a post-war, low-income 
country—which allocates US$2 million, US$1 million, US$500,000 per annum from the 
national budget to political parties, coalitions or alliances that come in first, second, and 
third places, respectively, in the presidential race, to be used as campaign finance in 
subsequent elections (Government of Liberia 2012). Given Liberia’s nascent 
consolidation of multi-party democracy, the Act will enable parties of varying sizes—
although quite likely UP, CDC and one other—to shore up financing that would 
otherwise not be available, thus making 2017 high-stakes on both political and financial 
grounds.  
  
Missing Elements and Existential Threats  
 
In sharp contrast to the conspicuous presence of novice presidential hopefuls such as 
Cummings, Urey, Morlu and Jones, 2017 may be marked by missing elements, including 
Sherman, who in May 2016 was indicted alongside Tyler for allegedly violating public 
procurement regulations, ‘committing multiple criminal offences, bribery, economic 
sabotage, criminal conspiracy, solicitation and facilitation’ in the Sable Mining case 
previously mentioned (Front Page Africa 2016d). While there has been a mushrooming 
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of new political parties, including Tyler’s LPDP (Front Page Africa 2016h), the waning 
influence of Sherman and others of his ilk potentially signals major winds of change.  
 
With Howard Taylor now definitively serving as vice-presidential running mate to Weah 
and Sirleaf clearly ineligible to run, 2017 also potentially signifies the first post-war 
election in which a woman with political clout will not be a presidential candidateiii (The 
New Dawn 2017; Front Page Africa 2016j). This change is indicative of a decline in the 
number of women in elected office under Sirleaf, which prompted the Women’s 
Legislative Caucus to propose in 2010 a Gender Equity in Politics Act mandating that 
women occupy at least 30% of the leadership of political parties in Liberia (Pailey 2014a, 
183-184). A diluted version of the proposed Act was incorporated into a 2014 elections 
law amendment that encourages political parties and coalitions to ‘endeavour’ to ensure 
that 30% or more of their governing body compositions and lists of candidates are 
women (Government of Liberia 2014b). Moreover, a less radical, tokenistic Affirmative 
Action for Equitable Participation and Representation Act of 2016 was passed reserving 
five seats for women in special legislative constituencies though it was immediately 
overturned for being ‘unconstitutional’ (Government of Liberia 2016; Capitol Times 
Online 2016; UN Women 2016; personal communication, December 12, 2016).  
 
Other facets of change that may likely affect the outcomes of the October 2017 race are 
UNMIL’s complete handover of responsibility for Liberia’s security to the government 
and the aftershocks of the Ebola outbreak. While UN military presence was a consistent 
feature of the 2005 and 2011 elections, in 2017, UNMIL will only stand at 1,240 military 
personnel and 606 police officers (Executive Mansion 2016). This marginal force may or 
may not have an impact on the prospects of a peaceful franchise for Liberians, but it 
could affect the electorate’s voting choices, with candidates who are likely to maintain 
peace faring better than those who may be more volatile, such as Johnson. Similarly, 
Liberians’ tactile experiences of the Ebola outbreak and the government’s woefully slow 
and inadequate response, which did not feature at all in the consciousness of voters in 
2005 and 2011, will likely strengthen opposition narratives of an inefficient, Sirleaf-led 
administration and the inability of her ‘pseudo-incumbent’ vice-president to handle future 
outbreaks or similar existential threats (Pailey forthcoming).   
 
Conclusion 
 
The features of the Liberian state, political parties, candidates and electoral processes 
explored in this briefing illustrate that Liberia’s transition into multi-party democracy and 
post-war transcendence will be tested in October 2017. We have opted to focus primarily 
on presidential prospects and party politics, which we believe will serve as a microcosm 
of the more expansive legislative franchise.  
 
While the 2005 and 2011 presidential elections were saturated with recycled politicians, 
2017 will usher in a new batch of candidates, some of whom are political neophytes who 
have been less tainted by controversy, thus possessing the name recognition and financial 
clout that make what appears to be predictable, unpredictable. Although political novices 
are least likely to win in the presidential race, they have forced established politicians 
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into more meaningful political alliances and coalitions.  In addition, while 
transnationalism remains a consistent feature of the race, with candidates residing in 
more than one locale vying for the highest political office, new regulations likely to be 
enforced around residency, citizenship, civil service comportment, and campaign finance 
have emerged to clip the wings of some candidates while giving others a slight 
advantage.  
 
Most importantly, 2017 is largely a referendum on Sirleaf’s 12-year presidency—and 
thus, rightly or wrongly, the position of women in elected office—as well as a litmus test 
for Boakai’s ‘pseudo-incumbency’. Although policy issues have not featured prominently 
in the public discourse, the electorate seems to be yearning for candidates with practical 
solutions to Liberia’s grim socio-economic outlook. Candidates continue to preach the 
same gospel of economic revitalisation, reformed governance and rule of law, improved 
infrastructure and social services, yet, what matters most in 2017 is previous performance 
in actual delivery of country-wide goods, and the ability to maintain Liberia’s very fragile 
14-year peace. From another angle, 2017 will be a test for party consolidation, 
representation in the form of small parties and independents, the effects of 
transnationalism, ethno-regional blocs, and the perceptions of localised delivery of 
goods—at election time and in the last 12 years—by candidates from president through to 
representatives. This was all evident in the 2014 Senatorial elections where performance 
in more localised contexts in the previous election cycle ushered in significant losses for 
incumbents. The elections may also be a test for the security forces, the NEC, the courts, 
the new laws, and the respect that candidates, parties and supporters have for these state 
offices and their promulgations.  
 
While there is a toss-up about whether continuity or change will define 2017, we have 
examined in this briefing how and why it may be the most highly contested election since 
the country’s armed conflict came to a dramatic end in 2003 and how these elections will 
lay down markers for future governments and voting in Liberia.  
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italics. 
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